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Abstract 
Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have 
become increasingly vital in the development of novel de-
fense and intelligence capabilities across all domains of war-
fare. An adversarial AI (A2I) and adversarial ML (AML) at-
tack seeks to deceive and manipulate AI/ML models. It is im-
perative that AI/ML models can defend against these attacks. 
A2I/AML defenses will help provide the necessary assurance 
of these advanced capabilities that use AI/ML models.  The 
A2I Working Group (A2IWG) seeks to advance the research 
and development of assured AI/ML capabilities via new 
A2I/AML defenses by fostering a collaborative environment 
across the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Intelligence 
Community. The A2IWG aims to identify specific challenges 
that it can help solve or address more directly, with initial 
focus on three topics: AI Trusted Robustness, AI System Se-
curity, and AI/ML Architecture Vulnerabilities. 
 Introduction   
Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have 
become increasingly vital in the development of novel de-
fense and intelligence capabilities across all domains of war-
fare. For U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelli-
gence Community (IC) organizations, the security, robust-
ness, resiliency and safety of AI and ML technologies is of 
great importance. Adversarial AI (A2I) and Adversarial ML 
(AML) methods deceive and manipulate AI and ML tech-
nologies. These adversarial methods have the potential to 
result in degraded performance of AI and ML capabilities, 
which can potentially cause catastrophic failures for mis-
sions that depend on them for success. Implementing as-
sured AI and ML capabilities is paramount to ensuring they 
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operate in a secure, robust, resilient, and safe manner for op-
erational use and adoption on the battlefield. 
 In pursuit of advancing the research and development of 
assured AI and ML capabilities, the A2I Working Group 
(A2IWG) formed to provide a collaborative environment 
across DoD and IC organizations that have shared interests 
in advancing work in understanding and defending against 
A2I and AML. The A2IWG will help the DoD and IC to 
address challenges and solve them directly as appropriate. 
 There are many challenges along the path to assured AI 
and ML capabilities. These challenges span across basic re-
search, applied research, development, fielding, and sustain-
ment. Most of these challenges are ongoing research topics, 
while there is some advancement that has been made beyond 
just research and development. The A2IWG seeks to focus 
on issues that are of the greatest value to the community. 
Moreover, the A2IWG will continuously conduct activities 
and complete tasks that are well suited to collaborative prob-
lem solving, helping to avoid duplicating existing efforts 
and spreading awareness of relevant existing efforts.  
 The founding members of the A2IWG determined that AI 
Trusted Robustness, AI System Security, and AI/ML Archi-
tecture Vulnerabilities are the initial three topic areas for 
which the A2IWG will focus efforts for the DoD/IC. Spe-
cifically, work on AI Trusted Robustness seeks to explore 
and address challenges that exist in the overlap between 
Trustworthy AI and Adversarial Robustness. Work on AI 
System Security seeks to map out a holistic defense-in-depth 
approach to defending AI and ML capabilities from A2I and 
AML. Finally, work on AI/ML Architecture Vulnerabilities 
investigates the fundamentals of A2I and AML methods and 
how they interact with different AI and ML algorithms. 
 
AI Trusted Robustness 
The concept of trust in computing can arguably be traced 
back to an origin with the National Academies of Science 
and their seminal publication Trust in Cyberspace in 1999 
(NRC 1999), predating Bill Gates’s famous “Trustworthy 
Computing” email he sent to every full-time employee at 
Microsoft in 2002 (Gates 2002). In that memo, he laid out 
four pillars: security, privacy, reliability and business integ-
rity, where one generally acceptable definition of reliable is 
“performing at or exceeding expectations.” Despite at least 
30 years of existence as a concept, its goals can still be elu-
sive and bugs are still found in modern software, regrettably 
sometimes catastrophically as evidenced by the Boeing 737 
Max Lion Air disasters of 2019 (BBC 2019).  Now, some 
say that we are in the middle of the “Summer of AI” and that 
it is due to the relatively recent advances in computer sci-
ence hardware such as graphical processing units (GPUs). 
When many people refer to AI, they are actually referring to 
the ML subset of it, and its successes in computer vision 
have brought about a strong desire for DoD/IC organizations 
to leverage it. ML can be non-deterministic and this property 
is at least one reason why “Trustworthy AI” may be even 
more challenging to attain than Trustworthy Computing. 
 Many organizations across the DoD/IC enterprise are 
seeking transformational capabilities by leveraging AI/ML 
while striving to attain “Trustworthy AI” despite its chal-
lenges. The DoD, for example, made clear its desire to do so 
in its 2018 DoD AI Strategy: “We will invest in the research 
and development of AI systems that are resilient, robust, re-
liable, and secure; we will continue to fund research into 
techniques that produce more explainable AI; and we will 
pioneer approaches for AI test, evaluation, verification, and 
validation” (Mears, Clark and Bozman 2019). So, what is 
“Trustworthy AI” and how can DoD/IC organizations attain 
it? This is a hard question that could remain an open area of 
research for this century judging by “Trustworthy Compu-
ting’s” 30+ years. Not surprisingly, many companies are ea-
gerly claiming to provide solutions, for a fee, and one has 
apparently even gone as far as trade marking the name 
“Trustworthy AI” (Trustworthy AI, Inc. 2020). Neverthe-
less, the concept of Trustworthy AI is still in a state of flux; 
however, following Deloitte’s lead, there are at least six pil-
lars that are worthy of consideration for the subset that falls 
under ML (Deloitte 2020).  Specifically, we should strive 
for ML implementations that are: 1) Robust/Reliable, 2) 
Safe/Secure, 3) Fair/Impartial, 4) Transparent/Explainable, 
5) Protect Privacy and are 6) Responsible/Accountable. 
 Mitigating A2I/AML attack vulnerabilities is a very ac-
tive area of research and development, is naturally an area 
of cybersecurity, and is also being invested in by DoD/IC 
organizations.  A2I/AML research and development funded 
and spearheaded by organizations such as the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 
(OUSD(R&E)), are charged with the development and over-
sight of DoD technology strategy for the DoD (OUSD 
2020).  Further, we can claim a success in advancing re-
search and development in assured AI/ML capabilities via 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
Guaranteeing AI Robustness Against Deception (GARD) 
program (Draper 2020), the DARPA Assured Autonomy 
program (Richards 2020), the DARPA Explainable AI 
(XAI) program (Turek 2020), as well as the through the In-
telligence Advanced Research Projects Agency (IARPA) 
Trojans in AI (TrojAI) program (Alstott 2020). These or-
ganizations are actively striving to advance A2I/AML re-
search and development, and it is these types of investments 
that will push the DoD/IC towards achieving the challenging 
and lofty goals of Trustworthy AI. 
AI System Security 
Despite the end goal of secure AI/ML enabled capabilities, 
much of the research and development in A2I/AML defense 
focuses primarily on only the AI/ML model itself. Current 
research lacks focus on a defense for the entire AI/ML engi-
neering pipeline. Common AI/ML engineering pipelines are 
composed of data collection, feature engineering, model 
training/validation/testing, and model deployment. Each 
stage of the AI/ML engineering pipeline must be protected 
against an adversarial attack in order to have a comprehen-
sive defense. A2I/AML defenses are commonly focused on 
modalities applicable to computer vision and spam filtering. 
In contrast, there is a lesser focus on A2I/AML defenses on 
modalities applicable to cyber defense. Most A2I/AML de-
fenses that perform well in computer vision and spam filter-
ing applications have limited success in network defense ap-
plications (De Lucia and Cotton 2020; Alhajjar, Maxwell 
and Bastian 2020). Thus, many of the state-of-the-art de-
fenses are not generically applicable to all AI/ML models. 
 A common goal of an A2I/AML attack is to cause mis-
classification by AI/ML models. In the cyber domain, for 
example, the attacker’s A2I/AML objective is characterized 
by three common types of misclassifications. A Targeted 
False Negative misclassification attack misleads an AI/ML 
model to classify a malicious sample as benign (i.e., avoids 
detection) (De Lucia and Cotton 2020). The objective of a 
Targeted False Positive misclassification attack is to inhibit, 
deny or degrade the targeted AI/ML models by causing ef-
fects that deny the availability of valid responses from the 
models. Lastly, some targeted misclassifications are utilized 
by A2I/AML to cause specific reactions, within a capability 
or system that relies on the AI/ML model, that are desirable 
to the attacker. 
 Many investigations primarily focus on protections 
against evasion attacks, which focus on identifying inputs 
that produce misclassifications during the test phase (i.e., 
runtime data). Data poisoning attacks target earlier stages of 
AI/ML engineering pipeline by maliciously tampering with 
data collection, for example, which can have cascading ef-
fects on the following phases in the pipeline. These cascad-
ing effects can compromise the security of the resulting 
AI/ML model. Defenses that protect these earlier stages 
(data collection, feature engineering and training) from the 
effects of data poisoning are critical, as these types of attacks 
can degrade prediction quality or redirect predictions alto-
gether (Devine and Bastian 2019). It is critical to consider 
the chain of custody and the source of data and its corre-
sponding labels. In addition to evasion and poisoning at-
tacks, attackers can infer information about training data, 
and attackers can approximately reconstruct the AI/ML 
model for further analysis and exploitation. A more compre-
hensive AML taxonomy is available from the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology (Tabassi et al. 2019). 
 Many AI/ML models integrate with larger systems, prod-
ucts or capabilities and require safeguards to protect the un-
derlying AI/ML models from A2I/AML attacks. There is a 
vast amount of research in the cybersecurity domain to ad-
dress system-level security concerns. Understanding and ad-
dressing these concerns and risks is critical to addressing 
A2I/AML defenses in the deployment phase. This is usually 
accomplished by processes such as the application of risk 
management frameworks, red teaming exercises, penetra-
tion tests and security audits. Similar processes that are fo-
cused on defending against and modeling A2I/AML attacks 
will need to be developed. Such an A2I/AML security eval-
uation of systems leveraging AI/ML will be essential in in-
forming system engineers of A2I/AML vulnerabilities. 
Methods to conduct security evaluation of AI/ML models 
have not been sufficiently investigated to date. Risk identi-
fied by assessment vulnerabilities will need to have corre-
sponding mitigations and defensive measures. This mapping 
of A2I/AML risks to defenses has not been sufficiently in-
vestigated either. Some suggest AI/ML designers should 
model and simulate an adversary, evaluate the impact, and 
develop countermeasures (Biggio and Roli 2018). 
AI/ML Architecture Vulnerabilities 
It is important to explore the vulnerabilities that arise from 
different AI/ML model architectures, such as supervised 
learning, unsupervised learning, and reinforcement learning. 
An overview of known adversarial attacks highlights how 
different AI/ML model architectures lead to different types 
of vulnerabilities.    
 Attacks on supervised learning have been well docu-
mented via several avenues, especially in the computer vi-
sion domain. A general breakdown of attacks is through 
mimicry of representations with adversarial data (Feature 
Collision, Convex Polytype) or though minor perturbation 
which are then added to base images to collide in feature 
space (Clean Label Backdoor, Hidden Trigger Backdoor). 
These attacks have shown viability of the adversarial data 
examples, yet an understanding of how viability relates to 
real world risk requires quantification. Transferability of at-
tacks is especially of interest for the government sector 
where models may not be openly available. Simple changes 
to the stochastic optimization can render previous examples 
non-viable (Schwarzschild et al. 2020). Statistical quantifi-
cation of risk requires a uniform attack budget (% adversar-
ial data). Stochastic optimization implies a need for statisti-
cal significance arguments rather than singular examples. 
Additionally, not all labeled classes are equally vulnerable, 
random sampling is required (Schwarzschild et al. 2020). 
Further, domains such as cyber, require a deeper under-
standing of when percent risk of adversarial attack is the best 
judge, versus a single catastrophic rare event attack. 
 As an unsupervised anomaly detection models determine 
a baseline of normal behavior and then looks for deviations 
from that baseline; for example, identifying malicious activ-
ity on a computer network by looking for unusual behavior. 
Attacks against anomaly detectors typically target the 
AI/ML model’s understanding of what is normal. Poisoning 
attacks seek to expand the definition of normal to include 
malicious activity, while evasion attacks seek to modify ma-
licious activity to fit the definition of normal. Anomaly de-
tectors rely on a low amount of malicious activity occurring 
at training time. If a computer is already full of viruses, then 
they will be incorporated as part of the baseline normal. 
Anomaly detection models that are continuously trained on 
live data are susceptible to “boiling frog” attacks where the 
training data is gradually altered to be more and more anom-
alous (Rubinstein et al. 2009). This poisons the model while 
avoiding setting off alerts by presenting data that the current 
models finds anomalous.  
 Reinforcement learning can be used in environments 
where the agent can observe the state of the environment, 
take an action, and then receive feedback. For example, re-
inforcement learning is commonly used to learn how to play 
a video game. The agent observes the state of the game, then 
chooses an action from legal moves of the game. Feedback 
is typically provided based on the score or who won.  At-
tacks against reinforcement learning models have been de-
veloped in two forms. First, there are attacks that manipulate 
the agent’s observations (Lin et al. 2017). For example, al-
tering the display information from a video game can trick 
the agent into the incorrect action. The second avenue of at-
tack is to tailor an adversarial opponent use blind spots or 
gaps in the agent’s training. For example, in a virtual racing 
program an adversarial opponent discovered that simply 
falling down in unusual ways caused the other agent to mal-
function and not finish the race (Gleave et al. 2019). 
Conclusions 
While many areas in A2I/AML research and development 
still need continued advancement, the current DARPA and 
IARPA programs have been leading the way across the 
DoD/IC enterprise in advancing the state-of-the-art. In addi-
tion to these two organizations, the OUSD(R&E) has sev-
eral science and technology modernization research and de-
velopment efforts underway in the domains of AI/ML and 
autonomy making advances in critical areas to include 
AI/ML verification and validation, AI robustness and resili-
ency, ethical AI, and other areas related to A2I/AML.  
 Given these recent advancements, the A2IWG has many 
different topics to deep dive. The topics of AI Trusted Ro-
bustness as a subset of Trustworthy AI, AI System Security, 
and AI/ML Architecture Vulnerabilities will continue to be 
scoped and refined so that more specific tasks can be iden-
tified that the A2IWG can address collaboratively. Through 
A2IWG collaborative meetings, DoD/IC organizations will 
be able to meet with each other and identify transition op-
portunities and partnerships between efforts. While different 
efforts may have different goals or use cases, often they both 
rely on some of the same underlying foundational concepts. 
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